UDC 004.056.53
CSCSTI 20.23
Spatial data becomes personal in cases where, in combination with other data, they allow the data subject to be uniquely identified. In this regard, it is necessary to clearly distinguish in which cases such data should be considered personal and protected as personal, and in which this is not necessary. The purpose of the research was to determine a set of necessary requirements for the protection of spatial data in the context of personal data when developing systems related to location determination. To achieve this goal, a classification of systems that process spatial data has been carried out, approaches to protecting such data have been studied, and effective measures to protect them have been justified. Various methods of geomasking and depersonalization are considered as methods of data protection. As a result of the research, information security methods for selected classes of systems are justified and rationally distributed. A set of necessary requirements for the protection of spatial data when developing systems related to location determination has been identified, and directions for further research in this area have been identified.
geomasking, geofencing, geolocation API, depersonalization, point aggregation, areal aggregation, adjusting coordinates, coordinate replacement, FOAM
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